Abstract-Financial transmission rights (FTRs) are complementary to the locational marginal pricing of energy. The basic aim of the FTR mechanism is to guard forward contracts from uncertain congestion charges. FTRs are also useful to individual generators and loads for selling and buying power, respectively, at the prices of other locations. The concept has evolved, encompassing many features such as a simultaneous feasibility test, various ways to conduct auctions and allocations and secondary trading. FTRs also have a close relation to market power and transmission investment. This paper reviews most of the landmark research papers on the evolution of the FTR concept. It reports a comprehensive assessment of various facets of FTRs and allied issues. Financial transmission rights and flowgate rights (FGRs) are compared. The concept of long-term FTRs is discussed. The paper also touches upon future proposals in this area.
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I. INTRODUCTION

C
ONGESTION management in restructured power systems can be carried out efficiently through locational marginal price (LMP)-based energy pricing [1] - [7] . The basis of the LMP mechanism is the theory of electricity spot pricing by Schweppe et al. [8] . Under the locational marginal pricing approach, the independent system operator (ISO) calculates power dispatch schedules by maximizing the social welfare function within the available network capacity. The price of energy at a location is determined by the rate of decrease of optimal social welfare with respect to the fixed load increase at that location. These prices are the locational marginal prices. Locational marginal pricing can be carried out either on a nodal basis or on a zonal basis. However, one major problem of zonal pricing is accurately finding the zonal sensitivity factors [9] . Thus, each pool participant (individual generator or load) has to pay (load) or is paid (generator) the LMP at its location, whereas each bilateral contract has to pay a congestion charge (plus a loss charge if the system modeled in the LMP calculation is lossy) according to the LMP difference between its sink and source locations. The net collection (which is generally nonnegative) of the ISO is termed the merchandizing surplus. This kind of energy pricing can generate useful price signals that assist in identifying suitable locations for building new generators, load centers, and transmission facilities. For instance, if the LMP at a certain location consistently displays a higher value, it provides an initial indication that this location may be a suitable place for building new generators. At the same time, by penalizing each bilateral contract with a location-dependent network usage charge, strong financial incentive is applied, making it account for the congestion in the transmission network. The pool prices also recognize the system limits. The possibility of administrative transmission load relief (TLR) thus becomes very small. Moreover, due to the auction-based allocation of transmission capacity, relative needs of the market players for the transmission usage are suitably assessed.
Although the LMP mechanism has an appeal for efficient congestion management, this mechanism inherently creates price risk (in the form of unpredictable congestion charges), especially for long-term forward contracts. This may hamper longterm power trading. However, long-term (or, at least, mediumterm) forward contracts are desirable to increase competition in the market as they play an important role in curbing the market power of generators [10] - [12] . Therefore, the LMP mechanism also needs the support of some complementary methodology or tool to guard the long-and medium-term forward contracts from congestion price risk.
Financial transmission rights (FTRs) are risk-hedging instruments designed mainly with the aim to minimize the congestion price risk for forward contracts [1] , [13] , and [14] . FTRs are now successfully implemented in many power markets such as PJM, New York, New England, and others [15] - [22] . Similarly to the physical transmission rights (PTRs), FTRs also define transmission property rights, but in financial form. Under PTR methodology, a market player must have sufficient transmission reservation to get his transaction scheduled without any network usage charge. A PTR is an option (i.e., the owner may or may not use it) transmission right that may be either firm or of use it or lose it type. Unlike PTRs, FTRs are completely financial in nature and do not interfere with the power scheduling process. Basically, an FTR provides its owner with some financial support to pay the congestion price that he is charged in the day-ahead energy market for his transaction. An individual generator or load can also buy an FTR to adjust its sale or buy price, respectively, to the LMP of a different location. For this purpose, a generator needs to buy an FTR "from" its location, whereas a load needs to buy an FTR "to" its location.
The basic parameters defining an FTR are a source, a sink, a validity period, and a MW amount. The source/sink of an FTR need not be a single bus. It could be a load zone, or a hub, or an interface for which an LMP is calculated and posted (i.e., it can be any price node). For instance, in PJM, a network transmission service customer [23] can ask the ISO for an FTR from a generator node to a load zone [17] . Moreover, in the case where energy prices are calculated on a zonal basis [24] rather than a nodal basis, FTRs are to be issued between individual zones rather than between nodes. Under a hybrid pricing approach, in which some energy prices are calculated at the node level and others at the zone level, FTRs are available even between a node and a zone.
Each FTR is assigned a monetary value for each hour depending upon the day-ahead (or real-time if the day-ahead market is absent) LMP outcomes for that hour (if network loss is also considered in the dispatch model, only the congestion components of LMPs are to be used for calculating the hourly values of FTRs [22] ). The FTR owners are paid by the ISO according to the hourly values of their FTRs. However, the settlement can be over multiple hours at a time.
The FTR mechanism has evolved with success since its inception in 1992. The motivation of this paper is to acquaint the reader with a comprehensive assessment of the evolution of the FTR mechanism. An attempt is made to summarize all the salient features of this mechanism in a comprehensible format. The contribution of the paper is to provide insights into the subtle and intricate aspects of the FTR evolution from various perspectives. Later developments which stem from the need for more flexible FTRs are also addressed in an integrated fashion. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The risk hedging functionality of FTRs is described in Section II. The revenue adequacy issue and the concept of simultaneous feasibility test are discussed in Section III. In Section IV, the FTR issuance processes are described in detail. Some current practices and proposals for the treatment of the revenue shortfall problem are discussed in Section V. The scope of the secondary trading of FTRs is discussed in Section VI. A comparison between financial transmission right and flowgate right is carried out in Section VII. The interrelationship between financial transmission right and market power is explained in Section VIII. A small discussion regarding how FTRs can incentivize private transmission investments is presented in Section IX. The concepts of long-term FTR, contingent transmission right, and locational FTR are outlined in Section X. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section XI.
II. RISK HEDGING FUNCTIONALITY OF FINANCIAL TRANSMISSION RIGHTS
With regard to the hedging adjustability, currently exercised FTRs can be classified into two categories: options and obligations. An obligation FTR is basically a fixed hedge FTR that always remains active. In contrast, an option FTR is an adjustable hedge FTR that becomes active only when congestion occurs in the forward direction. Irrespective of whether it is an option or an obligation, the value of an active FTR is always given by the product of its MW amount and the LMP differential on its path. Note that in the FTR context, a path is simply defined by a source-sink pair rather than an alternating series of lines and nodes. The value of an inactive FTR automatically becomes zero. Therefore, an obligation FTR may incur negative values at certain hours owing to the occurrence of congestion in the reverse direction, whereas the value of an option FTR is always nonnegative. The ability to implement transmission rights as obligations is one of the major advantages of FTRs over PTRs. The risk hedging functionality of FTRs is described below.
At a certain hour, the target payment (TP) towards the portfolio of a MW obligation FTR and a MW option FTR on Path is given by if if (1) Now, in this hour, the owner of this FTR portfolio has a physical transaction of MW on the same path. His payment for this transaction towards network congestion is given by (2) Therefore, the net payment made by the player for this transaction and FTR combination is given by if if (3) From this expression of net payment, the following risk hedging functionality of the above FTR portfolio can be seen. The second transaction is charged with this LMP difference only when the sink LMP becomes lower than the source LMP. Finally, the third transaction is never charged with the LMP difference. The above set of transactions is equivalent to the original transaction and FTR combination in the sense that for both cases the net payment to the ISO remains the same. Thus, it is clear that the player never loses money for the second and third transactions. Moreover, the second transaction gives him a benefit of in case is negative. However, the second part does not give any benefit when the player has to make a positive payment for the first part, i.e., when . Therefore, the first part remains completely risky for the player, but he observes no price risk in the second and third parts.
3) If
, the obligation FTR itself creates a price risk for its owner in that the player will have to make a net positive payment of on the occurrence of congestion in the reverse direction (i.e., when ). It can be seen that only a fixed physical transaction can be fully hedged by an obligation FTR alone. This transaction must be of the same MW amount as that of the obligation FTR and must be on the same path. That is why it is called a fixed hedge FTR. Even if the MW amount of this transaction falls below the MW amount of the respective obligation FTR, the market player has risks having to make a net positive payment under network congestion. This price risk is generated by the obligation FTR itself and, therefore, is termed the downside risk. In case the price risk is due to the physical transaction, it is called the upside risk. For a case in which the transaction amount is not fixed, both the upside risk and the downside risk can be avoided by using a portfolio of an obligation FTR and an option FTR instead of only an obligation FTR. This is because an obligation-option combination is able to remove risk completely for a band of transactions. The MW amount of the obligation FTR defines the lower boundary of this band, and its upper boundary is indicated by the total portfolio amount. Therefore, the option FTR allows its owner to adjust his hedge position, or, in other words, this FTR provides to its owner an adjustable hedge.
Although option FTRs can provide more benefit than do obligation FTRs, there is a certain trade-off that often makes obligations preferable to options, and this is explained in Section IV. Moreover, the above discussion on risk hedging is based upon the assumption that the direction of congestion is quite uncertain on a path. In a real system, there may be certain paths where the probability of congestion in the reverse direction is very low, and for those paths option FTRs are redundant. This is because the per MW value of an obligation FTR will most of the time be the same as that of an option FTR on such a path.
One point that should be explicitly mentioned here is that the discussion above basically explains how FTRs perform risk hedging for which, actually, they have been designed. As far as the settlement is concerned, each obligation or option FTR is settled individually and without any bearing on the actual energy schedules. Therefore, a market player does not need to have a transaction on the path of his FTR to get the value of this FTR. In practice even, a market player may sometimes choose to hedge the congestion price risk on a certain path by means of an FTR on a different path. However, upon such a decision, the market player becomes exposed to the risk of the difference between the LMP differentials on these paths.
III. SIMULTANEOUS FEASIBILITY TEST
AND REVENUE ADEQUACY Revenue adequacy is an important consideration in the issuance of financial transmission rights. There should be enough collection from the network congestion to pay full FTR credits. Revenue adequacy can be ensured through a mechanism called simultaneous feasibility test (SFT) [10] , [13] , [17] , and [25] , which can be stated as: If the network capacity available in a day-ahead market is sufficient to accommodate the power flow caused by the physical equivalents of active FTRs at the relevant hour, the congestion collection (day-ahead) must be greater than or equal to the total FTR target payment at this hour. Ideally, the network model to be used in the SFT should be the same as that used for power scheduling. The relationship between simultaneous feasibility and revenue adequacy is established below.
The day-ahead dispatch problem can be mathematically formulated as follows:
where if is a generation at Node if is a load at Node if is not related to Node Constraints (4) are the network capacity constraints. The matrix converts nodal injections into the line flows both for the forward and reverse directions assigned to the lines. The elements of are the line loading limits as available in day-ahead market. Constraint (5) is the power balance constraint and other constraints are self-explanatory. A numerical illustration of the power dispatch problem can be found in [26] . However, the Lagrangian of this optimization problem can be written as, (9) where , , , and are the vectors of Lagrangian multipliers. The LMP at a node is defined as the rate of decrease of optimal social welfare with respect to the increase of fixed (or inelastic) load at that node. Therefore, from the theory of sensitivity analysis [27] (10) Each pool contract is settled according to these LMP values. The congestion price to be paid by a bilateral contract is given by the rate of decrease of optimal social welfare with respect to the increase of the fixed transaction amount on the respective path. Therefore, this price is equal to the LMP difference between the corresponding locations. The net congestion collection (NCC) of the ISO is given by the sum of the payments made by the bilateral contracts, plus the sum of the payments made by the loads, minus the sum of the payments made to the generators, i.e., (11) According to complementary slackness condition of KKT rule [27] (12) Therefore, the expression for NCC can be finally written as (13) Let the net injection pattern caused by the physical equivalents of active FTRs results in a feasible power flow condition within the network capacity that is available in the above energy market. Therefore (14) The total target payment (TTP) towards these FTRs can be calculated as (15) It should be mentioned again that irrespective of whether it is an obligation or an option, the target payment towards an active FTR is always given by the product of its MW amount and the LMP differential on its path. Finally, the surplus amount (SA) of the congestion collection is given by (16) Equation (16), in conjunction with (14) and the nonnegativity condition of , proves that the surplus amount of the day-ahead congestion collection must be nonnegative if the physical equivalents of the active FTRs are simultaneously feasible. Note that such a relationship between simultaneous feasibility and revenue adequacy can be proven only for a linear power flow model, where each constrained network quantity can be expressed as a linear function of nodal injections [as in (4)]. A linear power flow model may be either a linearized ac power flow model or a dc power flow model. It was argued in [13] that the above relationship between the simultaneous feasibility of FTRs and revenue adequacy equally holds, even for an ac power flow model (which is nonlinear and nonconvex in nature). Currently, NYISO is the only market that employs this type of power flow model to perform power dispatch calculation and SFT. However, the proof provided in [13] assumes that in the dispatch problem, the injection at a node never hits its lower or upper limit. This may not be a valid assumption, since at certain hours, the injection at a node may touch a limit. More prominently, if the load at a certain node is inelastic, the injection at this node always remains at the limit. This is because the upper and lower limits for a variable representing an inelastic load must be the same. In reality, an SFT based on an ac power flow model cannot guarantee revenue adequacy [28] .
In the above derivation, a lossless power dispatch model has been considered. It should be mentioned that FTRs are able to provide hedges only against network congestion. Still no revenue adequacy test model is available to support loss-hedging (i.e., providing hedges against both network congestion and loss) FTRs. In the case in which network loss is also considered in the power dispatch model, each LMP is divided into energy, congestion and loss components, and the congestion components of LMPs are used to calculate the hourly values of FTRs. The total collection of the ISO is also accordingly divided in a net congestion collection and a net loss collection. As before, the payments towards FTRs are made from the fund of net congestion collection. The power dispatch problem still employs a lossless power flow model for the calculation of line flows, but some additional loads are created at the system nodes to represent network loss [2] . As before, revenue adequate congestion collection can be ensured by testing simultaneous feasibility of the active FTRs on this lossless power flow model.
IV. FTR ISSUANCE PROCESS
FTRs are issued by the ISO by means of auction and/or allocation. There may be different time horizons for the issuance of FTRs. As an example, FTRs are auctioned both annually and monthly in the PJM market.
A. FTR Auction
The FTR auction is basically a central mechanism by which the requirements of the participating market players are jointly assessed, compared, and then fulfilled to the best possible extent. In general, any market player can participate in an auction. First introduced in 1999 by NYISO, the auction mechanism is currently in practice in PJM, NYISO, ISO-NE, MISO, and CAISO. The different aspects of the FTR auction process are discussed below.
1) Participation Types: Market players can participate in an FTR auction mainly in the following four ways.
Self-scheduling: In this category of participation, a market player submits a price-insensitive FTR request to the ISO, i.e., the player is ready to spend any amount of money in order to procure his required FTR. Buy bid: In this category of participation, a market player requests to the ISO for an FTR along with specifying the maximum price he is willing to pay for this FTR. Surrendering: In this category of participation, a market player returns a portion of his current FTR to the ISO. The player is ready to accept any payment (even negative payment) for the returned FTR. Sale offer: In this category of participation, a market player offers a portion of his current FTR for sale, while specifying the minimum sale price. A sale offer can be thought of as a combination of a buy bid and a surrender. For instance, a sale offer of 100 MW FTR at $20/MW is equivalent to the combined participation of a buy bid for 100 MW FTR at $20/MW and a surrender of 100 MW FTR. There is also a proposal for the following type of participation [29] .
Conversion bid: In this category of participation, a market player requests to the ISO to convert a portion of his current option or obligation FTR into an obligation or option FTR, respectively. The player also specifies the maximum price (nonpositive for option-to-obligation conversion) he wishes to pay for this conversion. 2) Auction Formulation: Each FTR auction is cleared through an optimization calculation. A generalized auction formulation for the clearance of obligation FTRs can be found in [30] , whereas [31] and [32] explain how to modify this formulation when option FTRs are also included in the auction. The objective function (which is similar to the social welfare function in the energy market) of the auction optimization problem is the negated quote-based sum of the issued amounts towards all the FTR bids, and the function should be minimized. The cleared amount towards each bid must lie within its lower (which is zero) and upper (which is the requested amount) limits. In order to ensure revenue adequacy, the simultaneous feasibility condition (derived from the concept of SFT) must be satisfied while issuing FTRs. In case all the FTRs are issued for a same set of hours and conversion bids are absent, the simultaneous feasibility condition can be stated as: The physical equivalent of each possible active-inactive combination of individual FTRs (base as well as requested) must result in a feasible power flow condition for each possible topological scenario of the network. Here, the base FTRs are those entities whose quantity values are considered to be constants during the auction calculation. As an example, the FTR awarded to a market participant in an annual auction is to be considered as a base FTR in the subsequent monthly auctions. Similarly, a self-scheduled FTR is a base entity in an auction. FTR surrenders are also considered through base case modeling by subtracting the surrendered amounts from the original FTR amounts.
Note that we have to consider different active-inactive combinations of individual FTRs. This is because an option FTR becomes inactive if congestion occurs in the reverse direction. Similarly, different topological conditions of the network have to be considered in order to take " " contingencies into account. Thus, using dc power flow model, the simultaneous feasibility constraints for a certain line under a particular network topology can be written as (17) The vectors , , and contain the loading factors (i.e., coefficient factors) of the different FTR terms in the above simultaneous feasibility constraints. Here, , , and . The scaling factors and vary between 0 and 1. The value of a scalling factor would be 1 in case the corresponding constraint is already overloaded or 100% of the available network capacity (i.e., capacity that is available for awarding new FTRs) is offered in the auction. However, in the annual auction of ISO-NE, only 50% of the available network capacity is offered to the auction participants. In this case, both and are less than 1. The formulation of the simultaneous feasibility constraints is numerically illustrated in [32] .
Note that, similarly to PTRs, counterflows caused by the physical equivalents of option FTRs are also not considered in the line flow constraints. In order to consider conversion bids in an FTR auction, only a small amendment is required to the above formulation. A conversion bid can be considered as the buy bid for a special type of FTR, termed a conversion FTR. The bid for a conversion FTR is to be treated in the same way as an obligation or option FTR bid is done. The upper limit on a conversion FTR variable is given by the requested conversion amount and the lower limit is zero. The loading factor of a conversion FTR term in a simultaneous feasibility constraint can be calculated simply by subtracting the coefficient factor of the original FTR from that of the new FTR. For example, the loading factors of an obligation FTR and an option FTR on Path 1-2 are and 0, respectively, in a simultaneous feasibility constraint. The loading factor of an obligation-to-option conversion FTR on Path 1-2 in the given simultaneous feasibility constraint can be then calculated as . Similarly, the loading factor of an option-to-obligation conversion FTR can be calculated as . Next, consider that a market player initially (i.e., before the auction) had an obligation FTR of 50 MW on Path 1-2. Upon a conversion request, the market player is awarded an obligation-to-option conversion FTR of 20 MW on the same path in the auction. At the end of this auction, in essence, the player retains an obligation FTR of 30 MW and an option FTR of 20 MW on Path 1-2.
3) Auction Pricing: Financial transmission rights are priced following the same marginal pricing rule as that for the pricing of energy [17] . The auction optimization problem can be compactly formulated as s.t.
(18) (19) (20) Here, the vector contains all the requested obligation, option and converted FTR terms. Constraints (18) are the simultaneous feasibility constraints. and contain the loading factors of requested and base FTR terms, respectively, in simultaneous feasibility constraints. is the vector of scaling factors. The network capacity offered in this auction is given by , whereas indicates the total network capacity available for awarding new FTRs. Now, the Lagrangian of the above optimization problem can be written as (21) The price of an FTR similar to can be calculated as (22) In general, two FTRs are said to be similar (or of the same type) if they have the same loading factor in any simultaneous feasibility constraint. Therefore, according to (22) , the price of an FTR can be simply calculated by taking the sum of the products of its loading factor and constraint shadow price over all the simultaneous feasibility constraints. The auction participant pays or is paid this price depending upon whether this FTR is issued or bought back, respectively, by the ISO.
The FTR prices exhibit the following properties.
• Total collection from an FTR auction must be nonnegative if .
• In the case an FTR bid is fully or partially selected, the price to be paid to the ISO for this FTR must be lower than or equal to its bid price. • In the case an FTR offer is fully or partially accepted, the price to be paid by the ISO for this FTR must be higher than or equal to its offer price.
• An FTR bid would be fully selected if its bid price is higher than the clearing price of a similar FTR.
• An FTR offer would be fully accepted if its offer price is lower than the clearing price of a similar FTR.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide the mathematical proofs of these properties. Furthermore, obligation FTRs are, in general, cheaper than option FTRs. This is because [as obvious from (17)] the loading effect of (i.e., capacity consumed by) an option FTR on any simultaneous feasibility constraint cannot be lower than that of the obligation FTR with the same parameters.
4) Time Differentiation of FTR Products:
In order to track the time variations (seasonal, weekly, or daily) of load, financial transmission rights are generally issued for different time intervals over any time horizon. For example, separate FTRs are issued for on-peak hours and off-peak hours in the PJM market [17] . The PJM market also issues multi-interval FTRs with 24-h validity within a day. A multi-interval FTR basically spans two or more individual time intervals, whereas a single-interval FTR remains valid only for the hours of a particular interval. In the absence of multi-interval FTRs, an independent auction can be conducted for each individual interval. However, if multi-interval provision is also included, the auction has to be cleared through a joint optimization calculation accounting for all the time intervals simultaneously. There must be a separate set of simultaneous feasibility constraints for each individual time interval. The buyer of a single-interval FTR has to pay the price for the corresponding interval only. However, the price to be paid for a multi-interval FTR is the sum of the prices of the individual intervals spanned by this FTR [15] .
5) Multi-Round Auction: Multi-round auctions are becoming increasingly popular. For instance, the annual auction in the PJM is conducted in four rounds [17] . In each round, a quarter of the available network capacity (i.e., available for the auction as a whole), plus any capacity not awarded in the previous round, is offered to the auction participants. The results of a round are published before the next round begins. Any FTR awarded in a certain round can be offered for sale in subsequent rounds. The main motivation behind the multi-round approach is to make the auction process more flexible and competitive. This gives both the winners and losers the opportunity to revise their bids and try again following the result of an auction round [29] .
B. FTR Allocation
Unlike an FTR auction, FTR allocation is not a bid-based mechanism. Therefore, no market-based measure is associated with the FTR allocation process as to the relative needs of the participating market players. As a result, FTR allocation is generally kept restricted to the firm transmission customers only. Furthermore, as option FTRs consume more network capacity than do obligation FTRs, FTRs of the former type are generally not issued via allocation. Different measures in different markets exist for the allocation of FTRs, such as existing transmission reservations, past transmission usages and load ratio shares [17] , [22] , and [33] . FTR allocation can be carried out either on a first-come-first-serve basis or through a joint clearance. There are two alternative approaches for allocating FTRs, and these are discussed below.
1) Direct Allocation:
In this approach, an eligible market player is awarded a firm FTR quantity completely free of cost. Direct allocation of FTRs is currently carried out in MISO, NYISO and CAISO [22] , [33] , and [34], and was formerly in practice in the PJM market. The same simultaneous feasibility condition as described in Section IV-A2 should again be satisfied when allocating FTRs directly. In order to enhance the retail-side competition, directly allocated FTRs are reassigned among the load serving entities (LSEs) on a daily basis following the movement of retail customers [33] . This reassignment is realized by assigning counterflow FTRs to the loadlosing LSEs. A counterflow FTR is basically an obligation FTR that is assigned to a certain party in order to compensate the power flow caused by the FTR assigned to another party [33] and [35] .
2) Auction Revenue Right: Auction revenue right (ARR) is a mechanism through which the proceeds from an FTR auction are distributed among the firm transmission customers. For instance, in the PJM [17] , ARR mechanism is used to distribute the annual auction collection among the firm point-to-point and network service customers. Each ARR is defined between a certain source-sink pair and for a certain MW amount. The ARRs issued in the PJM market are all obligations, whereas only option ARRs are issued by the ISO-NE [17] and [33] . Similar to FTRs, ARRs can also be time-differentiated (such as on-peak ARRs, off-peak ARRs, and 24-h ARRs). The value of an ARR is calculated in the same way as the value of an FTR is calculated. Here, the term "LMP difference" indicates the obligation FTR price on the ARR path for the relevant time interval. If the FTR auction is multi-round, the weighted average of the LMP differences from all the rounds is used to calculate the value of an ARR. The ratio of the weight factors should be the same as that of the basic network capacities offered in the individual rounds. Basic network capacity means the total network capacity that is offered in a round minus the capacity that is carried over from the previous round. The total network capacity, offered in the auction as a whole, is given by the sum of the basic network capacities offered in all the rounds.
In order to ensure revenue adequate auction collection, simultaneous feasibility must be checked while issuing ARRs, i.e., the physical equivalent of each possible active-inactive combination of ARRs issued for any time interval should collectively result in a feasible power flow condition within the network capacity offered in the corresponding FTR auction. Although ISO-NE offers only option ARRs, all ARRs are considered to be obligations in the SFT model, and their MW amounts are adjusted later depending upon the price outcomes of the corresponding FTR auction. However, in case an ARR owner is paid the full value of his ARR, this revenue completely neutralizes the payment (plus giving him some additional benefit if it is an option) that he has to make for getting an obligation FTR of the same MW amount on the same path, i.e., ARR mechanism is, in effect, an indirect procedure for allocating FTRs. The PJM market offers an additional flexibility to ARR owners, which is to convert their ARRs directly into FTRs. Similar to directly allocated FTRs, ARRs also follow the shift of loads among the LSEs.
It is often argued that the ARR mechanism is better than the direct allocation approach because the revenue from an ARR can be used to buy an FTR not only on the ARR path but also on a different path. However, the same benefit can also be obtained from a directly allocated FTR. The owner of the directly allocated FTR can surrender this FTR in the forthcoming auction to generate an ARR equivalent revenue that can be utilized to buy an FTR on a different path. Furthermore, the FTR quantities awarded through a direct allocation are firm having zero procurement cost. The ARR mechanism does not guarantee this benefit. In the case of the ARR mechanism, FTRs are physically released only through the auction while the firm transmission customers are provided with some financial support to buy their required FTRs. The main benefit of the ARR mechanism is that it helps in better management of the simultaneous feasibility of FTRs. In addition, the ARR mechanism provides more flexibility to the ISO to deal with the problem of revenue deficiency in an auction. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to present a detailed discussion on this matter.
V. TREATMENT OF REVENUE SHORTFALLS
Although every FTR issuance process employs some SFT model that is generally linear, there may be certain hours when day-ahead congestion collection becomes insufficient to pay full FTR credits. The reason behind such revenue shortfall is that FTRs are issued over a period of time during which the pathbranch sensitivities, base power flows (e.g., loop flows from the neighboring control areas), and the contingency consideration in the power dispatch model may vary. Therefore, the SFT model may not be precise enough to cover all the hours of the time horizon of interest successfully. Also, the network topology may get changed because of accidental line outages. In addition, line capacities may degrade. Owing to all these factors, the active FTRs at a certain hour may not be simultaneously feasible with respect to the actual network constraints in the power dispatch model. Such infeasibility may, in turn, lead to inadequate congestion collection from the day-ahead market. Also, it may not be possible to bridge completely the gap from the fund of the real-time congestion collection.
However, as an ISO is a nonprofit-making entity, there must be some mechanism to compensate for any such revenue shortfall. In NYISO, revenue shortfall is compensated by imposing uplift charges on the transmission owners [36] . The objective here is to link transmission maintenance standards with revenue inadequacy. NYISO also allocates net congestion surplus and FTR auction revenues to the transmission owners. However, the NYISO approach seems unable to provide proper maintenance incentives due to the uniformity of uplift charges [37] .
In another practical approach, as followed by the PJM, CAISO, and MISO [37] , FTR payments are derated when revenue shortfall occurs. In the PJM [38] , the positive FTR payments are reduced (but never made negative) in proportion to the respective target payments when revenue deficit occurs. FTRs with negative targets are given full credits. The excess congestion collection that gets accumulated over a month is transferred (if nonnegative) into a balancing fund. This balancing account also accumulates the excess FTR auction revenue from this month. After the balancing account is updated, the ISO first uses this fund to compensate partially (on a pro-rata basis) or fully the unpaid FTR credits of the particular month. The remaining amount in this fund is used to compensate (partially or fully) the unpaid FTR credits from all the previous months. The same sequence is repeated for each month within a planning period.
Unlike FTRs that are settled daily, ARRs are settled on a monthly basis in the PJM market. The shortfall in the auction collection is managed by derating the ARRs in the same way as described above. At the end of each planning period, the unpaid ARR credits are partially or fully compensated with the amount that remains in the above balancing fund after compensating the shortfalls in FTR payments. In the case some amount still remains in the balancing fund, it is distributed among the firm transmission customers on a pro-rata basis irrespective of whether or not they hold FTRs for their transmission services.
In [37] , it was shown that the above procedure for derating FTRs may create a gaming opportunity for certain market players, in that they can artificially create congestion on the transmission system. In order to suppress such gaming opportunity, a direct assignment technique was suggested in [37] based on the constraint shadow prices, their capacity degradations, MW amounts of the FTRs, and the path-branch sensitivity factors. The assumption behind this approach is that the network capacity degradation is the only reason for revenue inadequacy. Now, as mentioned earlier, there are also some other factors which may create a revenue shortfall situation. As a result, the suggested method may fail at certain instances, e.g., when revenue shortfall is caused by a line outage. However, the shortcoming of this direct assignment algorithm can be eliminated by use of a small modification. Initially, the net load caused by the physical equivalents of active FTRs on each simultaneous feasibility constraint is to be calculated. If the total load on a simultaneous feasibility constraint is found to be greater than its limit, the amount of overload is to be measured. For example, if the limit of a constraint is 100 MW and the total load on it is 120 MW, the amount of overload is 20 MW. Once all the overload amounts are calculated, these quantities should be used in the formula of [37] in lieu of capacity degradation amount.
VI. SECONDARY TRADING OF FTRS
Once awarded through central auction or allocation, FTRs can be traded bilaterally in a secondary market. In the secondary market, an FTR can be split into multiple FTRs with different MW amounts and different validity periods. The new ownerships are registered on the market database. However, in order to meet revenue adequacy criteria, the original FTR is not allowed to be broken into a collection of derived FTRs that loads some simultaneous constraints more than does the original. Following are some simple rules followed in the PJM [17] for the secondary trading of FTRs. FTRs with the same validity period must be equal to the MW amount of the original FTR.
5) Rule 5:
The validity period of any derived FTR must not exceed the validity period of the original FTR. In addition, an incremental limit has to be respected when splitting an FTR. In the PJM, this limit is 0.1 MW, i.e., the MW amount of each derived FTR transferred to a new owner must be an integer multiple of 0.1.
However, due to the point-to-point nature of FTRs, the above set of rules does not provide sufficient scope for the secondary trading of these instruments. The extent of secondary trading can be enlarged by means of the exchange mechanism described in [39] . A simple interpretation (with a small modification) of this exchange mechanism is that a market player can exchange an existing FTR with the ISO for a new set of FTRs at no additional cost, where 1) the validity period of each new FTR must be less than or equal to that of the original FTR; 2) the collective loading effect (may it be negative) of the new set on any simultaneous feasibility constraint must not be higher than that of the original FTR for any hour within the validity period of the original FTR. In a sense, this exchange mechanism complements the above secondary trading rules by providing market players with an additional provision to reconfigure their current FTRs.
VII. FINANCIAL TRANSMISSION RIGHT VERSUS FLOWGATE RIGHT
Flowgate right (FGR) mechanism is the alternative to the FTR mechanism in LMP markets. This mechanism was in practice in the formerly ERCOT [19] zonal market. Unlike an FTR, which is point-to-point (PtP), an FGR is defined on a transmission link (or flowgate) in a certain direction. By definition, each FGR is an option. The product of its MW amount and the shadow price of the corresponding link gives the hourly value of an FGR in the case that the link gets congested in the same direction. The shadow price of a link in the energy market is defined as the rate of increase of optimal social welfare with respect to the same capacity increase in both directions of this link. However, if the relevant link remains uncongested or congestion occurs in the opposite direction, the value of the FGR becomes zero.
In order to preserve revenue adequacy, the total FGR amount in any direction of a link is not permitted to be higher than the capacity of the link in the particular direction. However, no overall network-based SFT is required when issuing an FGR. Initially, FGRs are issued through the central auction or allocation process. In an auction, the purchaser of each FGR has to pay the shadow price of the capacity constraint considered in the auction. Once issued through central auction or allocation, FGRs can be freely traded in the secondary market. The secondary trading rules for FGRs are similar to the secondary trading rules for FTRs. A point-to-point transaction can be fully hedged by a certain portfolio of flowgate rights. The MW amount and direction of the required FGR on a flowgate are the same as those of the physical flow caused by the transaction on the particular flowgate.
The motivation behind the development of this link-based concept was to enhance the decentralized trading of transmission rights [40] . Owing to its link-based nature, an individual FGR is more tradable than an FTR. The flowgate approach is based upon the following assumptions [41] : 1) power transfer distribution factors (PTDFs) are relatively stable; 2) the number of commercially significant flowgates (CSFs) is small and predictable. Commercially significant flowgates are those flowgates which are likely to be congested very often. FGRs are to be issued only on CSFs. The higher tradability of an individual FGR combined with a small number of CSFs can without doubt enhance the overall tradability of transmission rights.
The applicability of the FGR mechanism to a system relies on the structure of this particular system. This methodology is by far compatible with zonal pricing with radial interconnections among the individual zones. However, as discussed in [42] and [43] , FGRs may not be suitable for a meshed system owing to the following reasons:
1) varying values of PTDFs; 2) presence of a large number of contingent flowgates.
The PTDF between a link and the path of a transaction may vary depending upon the system loading condition. Also, other controls, such as tap changing transformers' tap positions, affect the PTDF values. Now, the matching portfolio of FGRs for a certain transaction has a direct functional relationship with the actual PTDF values. Therefore, the uncertainty in PTDFs is finally translated into the form of uncertainty that a market player faces about the risk hedging capability of his FGR portfolio. However, a combined study of [44] and [45] indicates that the DC PTDFs with current nominal network parameters may be good references for defining the risk hedging ability of an FGR portfolio over a long period of time.
A very serious problem arises, however, owing to the contingency consideration in the power dispatch problem. The energy market is generally cleared in such a way that the system can sustain " " contingencies. Now, the PTDF values are different for different topologies of the network. As a result, each physical line corresponds to multiple links or flowgates-one for each topological condition of the network (i.e., each flowgate is defined by a physical line and network topology pair). This, in turn, may lead to a multitude of CSFs. For example, let the number of potentially congested lines in a power network be only 10. However, apart from the base network topology, 20 different contingent topologies are also considered in the power dispatch model for the sake of system security. Therefore, the total number of CSFs can be as large as 200 (i.e., 20 10) . Such myriad CSFs clearly invalidate Assumption-2 and indicate the impracticality of the FGR approach for this system. Moreover, an additional problem arises in case the base network topology gets changed because of some accidental line outages. As a flowgate is defined by a certain line-topology combination, most of the previous flowgates become undefined in this new system. This, in turn, creates an extra task of redefining the existing FGRs with reference to the new system configuration.
In the case of the FTR mechanism, the field of influence of the above factors is the revenue adequacy issue. However, in most of the markets, "
" contingencies are also considered in the SFT model. Although line outages and distribution factor variations can create a revenue shortfall problem, its severity may be reasonably minor [43] . The main reason for this is that simultaneous feasibility is sufficient but not necessary to make congestion collection revenue adequate. Moreover, the set of FTRs issued may still be simultaneously feasible. In addition, any revenue shortfall can be compensated in future with excess congestion collections. As a result, most of the LMP-based power markets running successfully have found FTRs rather than FGRs to be more suitable for their systems. Even in a radial system, FTRs can be made equally tradable to FGRs through the implementation of the FTR exchange policy, which is discussed in Section VI.
VIII. FTRS AND MARKET POWER
With regard to the interaction between FTRs and generators' market power, there is consensus among some studies in previous literature on the point that FTRs increase the market power of the generators at the importing nodes [46] - [48] . On the other hand, an analysis based upon the prisoners' dilemma and Cournot competition was presented in [49] with the inference that FTRs are able to curb market power. However, the analysis presented in [49] is basically concerned with the long-run profits of strategic generators rather than the long-run effect of their strategies on market prices [50] . But, in the end, the relation of the term "market power" is with market prices, not with the profits of generators. Therefore, [49] cannot properly justify its proposition.
The market power, induced by FTRs themselves, counteracts to the competitive benefit that can be obtained by hedging the LMP risk of the forward contracts. In order to suppress the growth of such market power, FTRs should be prevented from falling into the hands of strategic generators. In [51] , it was proposed that any FTR should be issued either from or to a common point, determined by a certain measure called relative cross-price sensitivity. However, this approach seems to interfere with the risk-hedging objective of the FTR mechanism since a market player may not be able to collect the same quantity for both the load end and generator end FTRs to hedge his transaction. As a result, it may not be accepted for practical implementation. FTR-induced market power should be mitigated, but not at the cost of the risk-hedging benefit obtainable from FTRs.
Unlike firm PTRs, FTRs cannot be used to withhold transmission capacity. This is because FTRs are purely financial instruments. However, by submitting a false schedule, an FTR owner, having no physical transaction to hedge, may artificially increase the congestion level on the transmission system for earning a higher profit. The situation is nicely exemplified in [52] . The player, then, has to withdraw this false schedule in the real-time market. As the direction of congestion usually remains the same in both the day-ahead and real-time markets, the real-time LMPs do not offset the day-ahead profit of the strategic market player. Although this kind of strategic activity does not indicate market power abuse, it causes a price rise at the constrained in (i.e., importing power) nodes in the day-ahead market. At the same time, as the unsold cheaper generations in the day-ahead market now appear in the real-time market, and as the previously blocked transmission capacity is also released in the same market, the real-time prices at the constrained in nodes may fall below even the corresponding day-ahead prices. This, in turn, causes a load movement from day-ahead to real-time. If the load movement is large, the day-ahead prices again fall. As a result, the loads now become attracted to the day-ahead market, which again increases the day-ahead prices. When the transient subsides (or becomes sufficiently attenuated), the constrained in LMPs in the day-ahead market may be higher than those that would have been present if the FTR owners had not behaved strategically. However, it is debatable whether the strategy can be continuously employed by an FTR owner.
IX. FTRS AND MERCHANT TRANSMISSION INVESTMENT
The transmission system has a key role to play to make competition successfully materializes in the power sector. New investments are required in transmission system in order to get increased power supplies from cheaper generators. Apart from regulated investments, private (or merchant) investments can also be considered to reinforce the existing network. Unlike regulated investments, a private investment is not passed through any central planning process, neither is there any regulated tariff-based return on any private investment. However, efficient transmission investments should be sufficiently incentivized. A transmission investment is efficient if it increases social welfare. It may be that there will be investments that are beneficial to the investor but harmful to the society. Disincentives should be provided to prevent such inefficient or detrimental investments.
The work of Bushnell and Stoft [53] suggested that incremental FTRs (IFTRs) may provide correct investment incentives to private investors. Under this paradigm, the additional FTRs, made possible by an investment, are issued to the investor. Bushnell et al. proved that if the risk-hedging FTRs match the power dispatch schedules in aggregate before the expansion, the net value of the incremental FTRs will be no greater than the increase of social welfare owing to this expansion. An interesting two-bus example illustrating the incremental FTR concept can be found in [54] . Incremental FTRs are currently offered in CAISO, MISO and NYISO, whereas PJM and ISO-NE offer incremental ARRs (IARRs) [33] . However, there are many obstacles to this particular market approach of transmission investment. The first problem is regarding the long-term issuance of IFTRs. Before issuing an IFTR, a base case must be prepared as to how many risk-hedging FTRs can be issued on the existing network. An accurate modeling of such a base case is a difficult task as risk-hedging FTRs are issued periodically (yearly and/or monthly). In [55] and [56] , a proxy-award mechanism was proposed to solve this problem, but the basis on which the algorithm for determining proxy awards is built is not clear. Another problem is that it may not be possible to restore simultaneous feasibility by issuing IFTRs according to the investor's preference. In this context, a combined flowgate right and admittance right approach was proposed in [57] as an alternative to the IFTR approach. However, the suggested approach seems not to be able to differentiate new investments from existing resources. Rather, this problem can be solved by issuing IFTRs in the reverse directions of some of the investor's preferred paths. Other critical problems regarding merchant transmission investments are the possibility of the destruction of LMP differences owing to a transmission investment, lack of coalition between the investor and the market players that benefit (i.e., free rider problem), and the need for some regulatory oversight to prevent potentially harmful investments [58] - [61] . There is also a threat of a reduction in the value of an IFTR owing to the future investments. 
X. OTHER FTR INSTRUMENTS
A. Long-Term Financial Transmission Right
B. Contingent Transmission Right
Contingent transmission right (CTR) [64] is basically a group-FTR concept. A CTR allows its owner to hold FTR on a number of alternative paths. This added flexibility provides market players with an additional (and cheaper) support to overcome the congestion price risk originating from the uncertainty in their transaction paths.
Structurally, a CTR is defined by a MW amount and a set of paths. The owner of the CTR can choose any path (but only one at a time) from the given path set to convert his CTR into an FTR. A CTR can be an obligation or an option. If it is an obligation, any FTR that it generates would be considered as an obligation FTR. Similarly, if it is an option, any FTR that it generates would be considered as an option FTR. The generalized form of the contingent transmission right is the multidimensional financial transmission right which is discussed in detail in [65] .
C. Locational or Unbalanced Financial Transmission Right
Unlike a PtP FTR, a locational FTR (LFTR) [13] is defined only for a point of injection (injection type) or a point of withdrawal (withdrawal type). The hourly value of a withdrawal type LFTR is given by the product of its MW amount and the LMP (or the congestion component, or the congestion component plus the energy component of the LMP) of the corresponding location. If the LFTR is of the injection type, the negation of the above product gives its hourly value. The bid price associated with an injection type LFTR request is usually nonpositive, whereas it is usually nonnegative for a withdrawal type LFTR request. Thus, an LFTR allows an individual load or generator to freeze its buy or sale price, respectively, in advance (when the auction is conducted) for a certain MW quantity. In other words, an LFTR is similar to a forward contract between the ISO and a generator or load. Therefore, LFTRs may increase the traded volume of power in the forward market, leading to the enhancement of market competitiveness. An LFTR must be an obligation. Apart from satisfying network capacity constraints, the physical equivalents of the LFTRs must be in balance (i.e., power balance) to ensure revenue adequacy.
XI. CONCLUSION
This paper provides a comprehensive insight into the FTR mechanism employed in centralized power markets to provide price guards to the forward contracts. An obligation FTR alone can hedge a fixed transaction only, whereas a band of transactions can be fully hedged by an obligation-option portfolio. Simultaneous feasibility is an important consideration in the issuance of FTRs. Auction and allocation are two alternative mechanisms for issuing FTRs. Market players can participate in an auction in a number of ways. In order to have revenue adequacy at any hour within the time horizon of the auction, it must be ensured that each possible active-inactive combination of the FTRs be simultaneously feasible. All the FTRs issued in an auction are marginally priced. Time-differentiated FTR products and multi-round auctions enhance the flexibility of market players. The allocation of FTRs can be carried out directly or through ARRs. Any centrally allocated or auctioned FTR can be freely traded later in a secondary market. By means of an exchange mechanism, it is also possible to reconfigure an FTR without entering into any auction. Accidental line outages, line capacity degradations, and imprecisions in the SFT model employed may sometimes cause revenue shortfall. Imposition of uplift charges on transmission owners and temporary reduction of FTR values are two major approaches to compensate revenue shortfall. Strategic generators may acquire additional market power through FTRs. This implies a need for some well-defined and feasible rules for appropriately restricting the ownership of these transmission rights. The alternative to the FTR mechanism is the FGR mechanism. However, FGRs may not be suitable for a highly meshed network. Apart from risk hedging, FTRs can also be used to incentivize merchant transmission investments. LT FTRs can provide more price certainty to long-term power contracts. The future CTR will provide market players with an additional support to get relief from the congestion price risk originating from the uncertainty in their transaction paths. Finally, by means of LFTRs, individual generators and loads can develop the flexibility to lock their sale and buy prices, respectively, in advance.
